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Reply 
Kenneth Joel Shapiro 
I am pleased to see that Bekoff and Jamieson (B&J) 
and I are in substantial agreement on many of the 
issues raised in volume I of their recent book and in 
my review of it. In particular, I agree with them on 
the following: 
1. 	Recognition of moral kinship with nonhuman 
animals is likely to follow recognition of 
"behavioral and emotional kinship." 
2. 	Cognitive ethology can provide an "epistemic 
infrastructure" necessary for the philosophical 
argument for and the public acceptance of that 
kinship. We should add that the emerging subfield 
of "animal studies" also can make an important 
contribution to that necessary empirical base. This 
enterprise, which provides social scientific 
studies of the ways in which nonhuman animals 
figure in our lives, already has given rise to 
academic programs and journals (Anthrowos and 
the forthcoming Society and Animals). 
3. Cognitivism is responsible for some recent gains 
in the re-minding of nonhuman animals, a 
necessary move in the recognition of kinship. 
And, in particular, I believe B&J agree with me on 
the following: 
1. Cognitive ethology bas residual 	problems­
notably, an adherence to methodological 
behaviorism, which, at times, revisits the 
limitations of its predecessor, behaviorism proper, 
and an over-reliance on the metaphor of the 
computer, which metaphor fails "to make room 
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for subjectivity" or, as I might put it, remains 
experientially thin. 
2. Partly offsetting this is the increasingly frequent 
use of language which attributes intention and 
purpose to nonhuman animals. 
3. However, for most investigators this intentionalist 
discourse is largely limited to a heuristic device 
and is not accompanied by a commitment to the 
fact of nonhuman animal minds and experience. 
B&J agree on my formulation of a dilemma for 
cognitive ethology but disagree on the prospects for 
and form of its resolution. As B&J rightly suggest, my 
account is purposely provocative, particularly on this 
issue of prognosis. I cannot predict the future and have 
given up trying since I bet on Carter in 1980. Frankly, 
prognostication is for me now a thinly veiled attempt 
at influencing, not predicting, the future. 
In that vein, I suggested that cognitive ethology will 
crystalize into a reductive physiological discourse on 
the one side and an interpretive science on the other. 
B&J mistook me to imply that the latter is for me a 
negative outcome. It is not. I simply "predicted" that 
biology or psychology or the emerging conglomerate 
field of cognitive science (computer science, cognitive 
psychology, linguistics, neuroscience and philosophy) 
will refuse to give it scientific standing. 
ln fact, I think B&J might agree with me that an 
interpretive science, one that complements traditional 
natural scientific methods with a broad range of 
qualitative, ethnographic, phenomenological and 
historical forms of inquiry, could provide the revised 
"conception of science" to which they optimistically 
refer. For an interpretive science emphasizes under­
standing and deemphasizes positivistic preoccupations 
with method and validity. Understanding refers to the 
harmony between the experience of those individuals 
being studied and our explication of that experience. 
Having "re-minded" them, an interpretive science of 
nonhuman animals would also give them back their 
experience, both of their own marvelous worlds and of 
the suffering to which they are prone. 
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